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ABSTRACT
Motor vehicle recalls occur frequently in the United States. The number of motor
vehicles being recalled has been increasing substantially over time. This paper examines
whether the number of vehicles recalled per month has an effect on the shareholder’s
monthly abnormal return. Monthly abnormal return is the return which cannot be
explained by the overall movement of the market. Five major auto manufacturers are
included in this analysis with data ranging from April 2005 to December 2014. Two
techniques are used in this paper; first, I use a series of ordinary least squares models
followed by a series of mean comparison t-tests. Overall, the results indicate that the
number of vehicles recalled per month provides little explanatory power of monthly
abnormal returns. The one exception is Ford, from which the OLS results indicate that a
10 percent increase in the amount of vehicles recalled (initiated by the manufacturer)
result in a 7.8 percent decrease in abnormal return. However, this result became weaker
in significance and magnitude with the addition of control variables. The majority of the
results indicate that the number of recalled vehicles does not affect shareholder’s monthly
abnormal return. It is likely that other attributes are more important and this suggests that
direct costs of recalls are minimal. The results support the previous literature of Rupp
(2003), who found the number of vehicles recalled had an insignificant effect on
abnormal return using data from 1973-1998.
viii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
With several recalls typically announced each month, motor vehicle recalls occur
frequently in the United States. These recalls are carried out to correct defective vehicles.
A single recall campaign can affect less than a hundred vehicles or tens of millions of
vehicles. Recall campaigns are not always severe or safety-related. The direct and
indirect costs to the manufacturer vary significantly between campaigns. The number of
vehicles being recalled has been substantially increasing since the 1960’s, especially in
recent years.
Rupp (2003) found that the number of vehicles recalled provided little explanatory
power for abnormal returns to shareholders using data from 1973-1998. The motivation
behind this paper is due to the large increases in the size and number of recalls over the
past ten years. This paper looks to readdress Rupp’s findings using more recent data and
a different technique. Rather than using a two- or three-day window surrounding
individual recall announcements, as the majority of previous literature has done, this
paper will use aggregated monthly data. Due to the large amount of recall campaigns and
difficulty determining when investors first learned of a recall, this paper will attempt to
capture a relationship between the number of vehicles recalled per month and monthly
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abnormal return for five manufacturers. These manufactures include Honda, Ford, GM,
Toyota and Nissan.
To accomplish this, two techniques will be used. First, a series of ordinary least
squares regressions will be estimated between abnormal return and the number of
vehicles recalled. Second, a series of mean comparison t-tests will be conducted to
estimate differences in mean abnormal returns between designated groups. First I will
address the latest trends in automobile recalls followed by previous literature on the topic.
Then I will discuss the data and methodology used in the analysis. Lastly, I will conclude
with some results and interpretations.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
In 2014, over 60 million vehicles were recalled in the United States, breaking the
record of 30.8 million vehicles in 2004, according to data from the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). General Motors recalled over 28 million
vehicles in 2014, setting a new record for any single auto manufacturer. The number of
vehicles being recalled in the United States has been increasing since the NHTSA first
started instituting them in the 1960’s. Also increasing is the average number of vehicles
affected per recall. Figure 1 below displays both the increases in recall campaigns as well
as increases in the average number of units affected by decade for nine of the largest
manufacturers.
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Figure 1: Unique Campaigns and Units Affected by Decade

Steinkamp, Neil, and Jake Reed. Report on Automotive Warranty Claims and OEM Recalls (2014)

There are several explanations for why auto recalls have increased in the U.S. First
of all, more vehicles are being sold and vehicles are becoming more complex every year.
Cars continue to advance in technology and equipment over time. A report by the Society
of Automotive Analysts (SAA) explained, “The rise in non-engine and electrical related
recalls suggests an increasing impact from vehicle technology” (Steinkamp et al. 2014).
This means cars are being produced with more complicated parts, increasing the chance
that a recall will occur on these pieces of equipment.
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In addition, auto manufacturers are saving money in production by using
interchangeable parts, or parts that are used in multiple models. Using interchangeable
parts is not a new concept. Henry Ford used interchangeable parts and an assembly line in
the early 1900’s in order to maximize production and reduce costs. Designing and testing
parts is an expensive process, so producing one ignition switch for all models is cheaper
than designing a unique ignition switch for each model. Interchangeable parts save time
and money in the production of cars. However, when one part is recalled it can
potentially affect millions of vehicles across multiple lines rather than just one.
Along with using interchangeable parts, auto manufacturers also outsource many
of the parts that go into their cars. Outsourcing parts can be cheaper for the manufacturer.
However, it can also increase the chance of a recall occurring since the manufacturer
does not have total control over the production and quality of these parts. The SAA report
notes that, “Increasing number of OEM/supplier collaboration agreements” and
“automakers’ increasing efforts to recover costs from suppliers” are both factors
(Steinkamp et al., 2014). Manufacturers are not only outsourcing; they are pushing for
parts to be made more cheaply by the subcontractors. Figure 2 below displays the total
vehicles affected by a sub-component group recall from 1996-2013 for nine of the largest
manufacturers.
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Figure 2: Time Series Summary of Recall Trends

Steinkamp, Neil, and Jake Reed. Report on Automotive Warranty Claims and OEM Recalls (2014)

Finally, an additional reason for the increase in auto recalls is due to regulators
punishing auto manufactures for not delivering recall data quickly enough. For example,
Toyota was fined $1.2 billion dollars in 2010 for its handling of the unintended
acceleration problems. Attorney General Eric Holder said, “Today, we can say for certain
that Toyota intentionally concealed information and misled the public about the safety
issues behind these recalls.”1 Penalties such as this one imposed on auto manufacturers
are a message to automakers that they need to find and address problems quickly and
honestly. Similar penalties will potentially increase the number of recalls auto
manufacturers initiate in order to prevent bigger losses to profit and reputation.

1

http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2014/03/19/toyota-settlement-unintended-acceleration/6595345/
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The increases in the number of vehicles being recalled over time is the motivation
behind this paper. Do larger auto recalls mean larger losses for shareholders? Auto recalls
involve substantial costs for manufacturers. Direct costs associated with a recall include
the cost of notifying consumers as well as all the costs associated with correcting the
defects. These direct costs are difficult to measure since recall announcements are not
required to give estimated repair costs per vehicle. However, direct cost per vehicle can
vary significantly. Indirect costs include the damage done to the reputation of the
manufacturer that can lead to reduced sales or prices in the future. These indirect costs
are more long-term in nature. This paper will examine whether or not a significant
negative relationship exists between the number of vehicles recalled per month and the
abnormal return for shareholders. In the next section previous literature on market
reactions to auto recalls will be discussed.
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CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW
Equity responses to auto recalls have been examined in previous literature by
several researchers. The findings have been somewhat ambiguous. With the magnitude of
auto recalls, researchers tend to select a relatively small sample to study, which might
explain the varying results. For example, Jarrel and Peltzman (1985) found that
shareholders suffered significant losses from the recall announcements. They used a
sample of only 116 “major recalls” that occurred between 1967 and 1981. They analyzed
cumulative excess returns for different sized windows surrounding recall announcements.
Jarrel and Peltzman (1985) also found significant spillover effects on competitor’s stock
prices.
Interestingly, Hoffer, Pruitt and Reilly (1988) revisited Jarrel and Peltzman’s work
and found errors in the data set. They made some revisions and found that “little
significant evidence remains indicating that security markets penalize shareholders for an
automotive recall by driving down share prices” (Hoffer et al. pp.669). In another paper
Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly (1987) found significant negative abnormal returns surrounding
the announcement of “severe” safety recalls.
Barber and Darrough (1996) examined 507 recalls for six manufacturers from
1972-1992. They found significant shareholder losses surrounding recalls for the
offending firm. However, they did not find significant effects on competitor’s stock
8

prices. Their finding conforms to the results of Jarrel and Peltzman (1985) that recall
campaigns affect the shareholder value of the announcing firm, but it contradicts the
conclusion that competitors are affected. However, this contradicts the finding of Hoffer
et al. (1988) who did not find significant shareholder losses to the announcing firm.
In more recent literature, Rupp (2001) examined whether or not governmentinitiated recalls are more damaging than manufacturer-initiated recalls for shareholders.
In doing so Rupp (2001) found significant equity losses surrounding recall
announcements but did not find a significant difference in effects between the initiator of
the recall. In this analysis, Rupp used recall data for six manufacturers from 1973-1998.
In another paper, using the same data, Rupp (2003) examined the attributes of a costly
recall. He found that the number of vehicles recalled provided little explanatory power of
abnormal returns for manufacturers. Given these results, Rupp (2003) suggested that the
direct recall costs are minimal. Rupp’s results indicate that shareholder losses are more
sensitive to the component category being recalled rather than to the size of the recall.
Given the substantial increases in the amount of vehicles being recalled as
discussed earlier, this paper looks to readdress the effect the number of vehicles recalled
has on the manufacturer’s abnormal return. This paper differs from previous literature on
two fronts. First of all, abnormal return is calculated month to month rather than using a 2
or 3-day window. Also, this paper focuses more on recent auto recall data from 2005 to
2014.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In order to capture a potential relationship between the number of vehicles recalled
per month and monthly abnormal return, two techniques will be used. First, a series of
ordinary least squared regressions will be estimated. For each manufacturer selected,
abnormal monthly return is regressed on the number of vehicles recalled per month. The
expectation is that the coefficient on the number of vehicles recalled will be negative and
statistically significant. If this were the case it would indicate that as the number of
vehicles recalled increases, the abnormal return decreases. Later, control variables are
added to the regressions to see how it affects the results. The main equations I will be
estimating are shown below:
1. 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝐵1 ln 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑒ℎ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
and
2. 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝐵1 ln 𝑉𝑒ℎ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 (𝑚𝑓𝑟)𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2 ln 𝑉𝑒ℎ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 (𝑔𝑜𝑣)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

Where AR = Abnormal Return, I = manufacturer, t = month, (mfr) = manufacturer
initiated, and (gov) = government initiated.
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Second, a series of Welch2 mean comparison t-tests will be conducted. The
purpose of these tests is to look for differences between mean abnormal returns in
different groups of months classified by the number of vehicles recalled. The first test
will compare months with zero recalled vehicles to months with greater than zero
vehicles recalled. The second test will compare months in which the number of vehicles
recalled is greater than the median verses less than the median. The third test will
compare months where the number of vehicles recalled is in the top 25th percentile versus
the bottom 75th percentile. In the second and third tests, months in which zero vehicles
were recalled are omitted. Welch’s t-test is used since it does not require the assumption
of equal variance and sample size. Next, the data collection and manipulation will be
addressed before discussing the results and interpretations.
Data for auto recalls is available online from the NHTSA recall database3. The
NHSTA was established by the Highway Safety Act of 1970 and is responsible for
setting and enforcing safety performance standards for motor vehicles and motor vehicle
equipment. They also keep records on automobile recalls in a publicly available dataset.
The NHTSA has recorded all U.S. auto recalls since 1966. For each auto recall the
NHTSA records the manufacturer, year, make, and model. The dataset also includes
details about each recall, including the initiator of the recall, dates regarding the status of
the recall, a defect summary, and the potential number of units affected. This paper
focuses on the “number of units affected” variable since it indicates the magnitude of the
2

Welch, B. L. (1947). The generalization of `Student's' problem when several different population variances are
involved. Biometrika, 34(1), 28-35. doi:10.2307/2332510
3
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/downloads/flatfiles.cfm
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recall. For ease of reading the “number of units affected” variable will be referred to as
the number of ‘vehicles recalled’ throughout the paper.
This paper uses a sample of five manufacturers including both domestic (General
Motors and Ford) and Japanese manufacturers (Honda, Nissan, and Toyota). According
to Edmunds4, these five manufacturers accounted for 65.8 percent of the U.S. market
share in January 2015. The sample is limited to 117 monthly observations ranging from
April 2005 to December 2014 with the exception of General Motors. Due to General
Motor’s Chapter 11 reorganization in 2009, all stock price data prior to December 2010 is
unavailable. Due to this issue the analysis for GM is limited to 49 monthly observations.
This paper uses monthly observations in order to analyze whether or not having
larger auto recalls is more damaging for the shareholder’s monthly abnormal return. To
accomplish this, the auto recalls are aggregated into monthly observations, rather than
analyzing the individual effects of each recall like previous literature has done. The
NHTSA dataset includes the date the owner is notified for each individual recall. The
number of vehicles recalled is aggregated into months by the date the owner is notified
while keeping government and manufacturer initiated recalls separate. By aggregating the
recalls separated by initiator, we have the total vehicles affected by recall(s) per month.
After aggregating the data, we are left with five monthly time series data sets, one for
each manufacturer. Table 1 below displays the average, minimum and maximum number
of vehicles affected by recalls per month during the sample period. The number of

4

http://www.edmunds.com/industry-center/data/
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vehicles affected ranges from zero to a maximum of over 6.5 million in one month for
General Motors.

Table 1: Number of Vehicles Affected by Recall(s) per Month (Apr 2005-Dec 2014)
n
Manufacturer Months
GM
49
Ford
117
Nissan
117
Toyota
117
Honda
117

Manufacturer Initiated
Average Min Max
516,528
0 6,576,706
63,867
0 1,572,829
64,969
0 1,248,032
189,369
0 4,445,109
64,969
0 1,248,032

Government Initiated
Average Min Max
210,664
0 2,519,424
196,671
0 4,500,000
22,297
0 665,210
105,868
0 3,300,008
22,297
0 665,210

Since the number of vehicles recalled has such a large range, the natural logarithm
is used in the statistical analysis. This will make interpretations easier as well. For each
manufacturer, monthly stock prices were collected from Yahoo Finance for the sample
time periods. Monthly returns for each manufacturer were calculated using the following
equation:
𝑅𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 =

𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡−1
∗ 100
𝑅𝑡−1

In order to calculate abnormal returns, the S&P 500 Index data were also collected
from Yahoo Finance. Monthly returns for the S&P 500 were calculated using the last
equation above. The abnormal return is calculated using the market model equation
where:
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝐵𝑖 𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,
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where t = month, I = ith stock

This ordinary least squared regression calculates the return for each manufacturer
that can be explained by the overall movement of the market. The results from this initial
regression are shown below in Table 2.
Table 2: Market Model Results Using S&P 500

Manufacturer
GM
Ford
Nissan
Toyota
Honda

Coef.
1.71***
2.1***
1.37***
0.68***
0.80***

t-stat
5.66
6.60
8.75
5.82
6.35

Adj. R2
0.39
0.27
0.39
0.22
0.25

n
49
117
117
117
117

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, p* p<0.1

The residual from the above equation is equal to the abnormal return for the ith
manufacturer’s stock. The residual represents the return for the manufacturer that cannot
be explained by the overall movement of the market. This is what will be used in the
main OLS regressions noted above by the term AR.
Several control variables were collected from the St. Louis Federal Reserve
Economic Data website which will be used in the OLS regressions5. These variables are
listed below in Table 3 with their summary statistics. Not all control variables were
significant for all manufacturers. They are used to see how the initial significant results
change with the addition of controls.

5

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/
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Table 3: Control Variables Summary Statistics

Variable
n
% chg oil prices
% chg gas prices
% chg CPI private transp.
Fed Funds Rate
% chg housing index
% chg disp. Income
%chg auto sales

Mean

Std. Dev
Min
Max
0.301
8.722
-28.200
0.213
7.134
-29.600
0.130
2.054
-10.800
1.585
2.039
0.100
-0.044
0.924
-2.000
0.166
0.911
-5.900
0.191
6.540
-35.800

117
117
117
117
117
117
117

22.600
16.800
6.200
5.300
1.700
4.800
28.100

Finally, for the mean comparison tests, the mean abnormal return is calculated for
a series of groupings. The first grouping is months with zero recalled vehicles as opposed
to months with any number of recalled vehicles. The second grouping is months in which
the number of recalled vehicles is less than or more than the median number of recalled
vehicles. The third grouping is months in which the number of recalled vehicles is less
than or more than the 75th percentile of the number of recalled vehicles. This is done
separately for each manufacturer. Mu (µ) is the average abnormal return for each group
and n represents the number of months in each group. The median and 75th percentile
number of vehicles recalled is calculated using only months in which recall(s) have
occurred. The results are shown in Table 4 below.
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Table 4: Mean Abnormal Returns for Different Groups
VA=Vehicles Affected GM
Ford
Nissan
Toyota
Honda
n=months
n
µ
n
µ
n
µ
n
µ
n
µ
No recall
5 -5.39
17 0.65
44 -0.12
38 -0.81
44 -0.27
Recall
44 0.61 100 -0.11
73 0.07
73 0.39
73 0.16
VA>median
22 1.13
50 -2.28
37 1.02
39 0.85
37 0.07
VA<median
22 0.09
50 2.06
36 -0.35
40 -0.06
36 0.26
VA>75th %
11 1.04
25 -0.11
19 2.68
19 1.32
19 1.31
VA<75th %
33 0.47
75 -0.11
54 -0.84
60 0.07
54 -0.24

The null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis for the mean comparison t-tests are
shown below. The null hypothesis asserts that the difference in means is equal to zero.
The alternative hypothesis asserts that the difference in means is not equal to zero. In the
next section, I will discuss the results for both the OLS regressions and mean comparison
tests. Additionally, interpretations will be made based on these results.

3. 𝐻𝑜: 𝜇1 − 𝜇2 = 0
4. 𝐻𝑎: 𝜇1 − 𝜇2 ≠ 0
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
First, the results for the ordinary least squared regressions will be discussed. The
results for equation 1 and 2 are shown in Table 5 below. Model 1 is a regression of
abnormal return on the log of vehicles recalled separated by the initiator (MFR/GOV).
Model 2 is a regression of abnormal return on the log of total vehicles recalled per month.
As can be seen, there is only one statistically significant result in Model 1, namely Ford.
Interestingly, only the number of vehicles recalled which were initiated by the
manufacturer is significant for Ford. The coefficient of -0.779 is interpreted in the
following manner: For a 10 percent increase in the number of vehicles recalled we expect
a 7.8 percent decrease in abnormal return. In Model 2, GM and Toyota have statistically
significant coefficients; however, they are only statistically significant at the 10 percent
level. Also, both have a positive sign suggesting a positive relationship between the
number of vehicles recalled and abnormal return. These results are the opposite of what
was expected.
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Table 5: OLS Results Excluding Control Variables
Dependent Variable=AR
GM
MODEL 1
ln Vehicles Recalled(MFR) 0.033

0.048

0.078

(2.700)

0.910

0.520

0.760

0.276

0.007

0.147

(0.109)

1.460

1.110

0.040

1.500

(0.830)

0.045

0.067

0.007

0.025

0.012

0.055

0.148* 0.053

ln Vehicles Recalled(GOV) 0.252

R2

Nissan Toyota Honda

(0.779)*** 0.116

0.150

R2
MODEL 2
ln Total Vehicles Recalled

Ford

0.383* (0.362)
1.760

(1.240)

0.440

1.690

0.520

0.062

0.013

0.002

0.024

0.002

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, p* p<0.1

Adding control variables to Model 1 did not change anything for GM, Nissan,
Toyota and Honda. As expected the variables of interest remain statistically insignificant.
The significant result for Ford, however, remained significant with the addition of control
variables and the results are shown below in Table 6.

Table 6: Ford Model 1 OLS Results Including Controls

Independent Variables
ln Vehicles Affected (MFR)
%change oil prices (L1)
%change Housing Index
%change CPI (private transp.)
%change autosales (L2)
FF Rate (L3)
constant
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, p* p<0.1
18

Coef
(0.679)**
0.53***
(3.54)**
(1.45)*
(0.309)
(1.17)*
6.09**
R2=0.18

T-stat
-2.38
2.810
(2.260)
(1.880)
(1.530)
(1.670)
2.490

As can be seen, when control variables are added the coefficient on the number of
vehicles affected by manufacturer initiated recalls is now only significant at the 5 percent
level. Before, it was significant at the 1 percent level. Furthermore, the coefficient is
slightly smaller in magnitude. Now, a 10 percent increase in vehicles affected by
manufacturer-initiated recalls results in a -6.8 percent effect on abnormal return. Without
access to manufacturer-specific monthly data, it is difficult to create a model which
explains a large percentage of the abnormal return for a specific manufacturer. With the
inclusion of five significant control variables, the model only obtains an R-squared of
0.18. This indicates that this model only accounts for about 18 percent of the variation in
abnormal return. The purpose of this is to show how the magnitude and significance
would change in a more complete model.
The results for the mean comparison t-tests are shown in Table 7 below. The null
hypothesis for this test is that the means are not significantly different from each other.
Interestingly, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for all groups and all manufacturers.
There is not a statistically significant difference in the mean abnormal return for months
with a relatively large number of vehicles being recalled. These results correspond with
the results from the OLS regressions so it is not surprising. Even months in which the
number of vehicles recalled is in the top 25th percentile the mean abnormal return does
not have a statistically significant difference from months in the lower 75th percentile.
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, p* p<0.1

-0.52
-0.28

GM
Answer T-stat
No
-1.89

Is the mean AR different in months when recalls occur?
In months where recalls do occur:
Do months with relatively larger recall(s) have different mean AR?
When # vehicles affected > median size
No
When # of vehicles affected > 75th Percentile
No

Hypothesis Tested

Table 7: Mean Comparison T-Test Results by Manufacturer

No
No

1.41
0.00

No
No

-1.24
-1.86

Ford
Nissan
Answer T-stat Answer T-stat
No
0.30 No
-0.13

No
No

-0.76
-0.87

Toyota
Answer T-stat
No
-1.09

No
No

0.13
-0.94

Honda
Answer T-stat
No
-0.40

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Although the number of vehicles being recalled is continually increasing, the
magnitude of recalls does not appear to have an effect on shareholder’s monthly
abnormal return. In both tests, it appears that the number of vehicles recalled does not
play a role in determining monthly abnormal return for manufacturers. Ford, the only
exception, appears to have a negative relationship between manufacturer-initiated recalls
and abnormal return. With a 10 percent increase in the number of vehicles recalled by
Ford, shareholders experience a -7.8 percent effect on monthly abnormal return.
However, the effect diminishes with the addition of control variables and it is difficult to
determine how significant it would be in a more complete model. Based on the results
from the mean comparison tests we are unable to conclude that larger recalls have a
significant effect on abnormal return for all five manufacturers.
The results are not that surprising since they correspond to the findings of Rupp
(2003), who found that the number of vehicles recalled provided little explanatory power
of abnormal returns even in a 2-day window surrounding the recall announcement. Rupp
(2003) suggests that a reason for this is that direct costs to the manufacturer are minimal.
Direct costs include the cost of repairs and notifying customers. It appears as if these
costs are minimal compared to other indirect costs, such as the damage to a firm’s
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reputation. Other attributes of recalls, as Rupp (2003) suggested, such as which
component is recalled are likely more important in determining the abnormal return.
There are potentially some problems with aggregating the data into monthly
observations. It is possible that the effects of the recalls are being washed out by other
events throughout the month. There are numerous events that can cause a manufacturers
stock price to change throughout the month. Events such as financial statements being
released, negative or positive news related to the company, sales forecasts, economic
conditions, insider information and many other factors can have a substantial effect on
the monthly abnormal return. This is partly why the majority of previous literature
examines 2 or 3-day windows surrounding recall announcements. This analysis could be
improved by doing this but unfortunately with the magnitude of recalls it would likely
take years to organize.
Another potential issue in drawing major conclusions from this analysis is the time
span and scope of the sample. This paper analyzes just five manufactures over a 10 year
time span. Ideally, all manufacturers would be included across the entire time span of the
NHTSA recall dataset. This is potentially possible for future research given more time.
The magnitude of recalls presents several issues. Investors may not react to each recall
announcement since there are so many, and many never make it into the news. Also,
given the mixed results from previous literature, it appears that the sample selection is a
large determinant of the results found. Future potential research on this topic would
include a larger time span with more manufacturers. Also, if the effects of recalls could
be isolated further, the accuracy of the results could be improved.
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